A sideways look at faithfulness for quantum correlations by Evans, Peter W.
A sideways look at faithfulness for quantum correlations
Peter W. Evans
September 21, 2020
Abstract
Despite attempts to apply the lessons of causal modelling to the observed correlations
typical of entangled bipartite quantum systems, Wood and Spekkens argue that any causal
model purporting to explain these correlations must be fine tuned; that is, it must violate
the assumption of faithfulness. The faithfulness assumption is a principle of parsimony,
and the intuition behind it is basic and compelling: when no statistical correlation exists
between the occurrences of a pair of events, we have no reason for supposing there to be a
causal connection between them. This paper is an attempt to undermine the reasonable-
ness of the assumption of faithfulness in the quantum context. Employing a symmetry
relation between an entangled bipartite quantum system and a ‘sideways’ quantum sys-
tem consisting of a single photon passing sequentially through two polarisers, I argue that
Wood and Spekkens’ analysis applies equally to this sideways system. If this is correct,
then the consequence endorsed by Wood and Spekkens for an ordinary entangled quan-
tum system amounts to a rejection of a causal explanation in the sideways, single photon
system, too. Unless rejecting this causal explanation can be sufficiently justified, then it
looks as though the sideways system is fine tuned, and so a violation of faithfulness in the
ordinary entangled system may be more tolerable than first thought. Thus extending the
classical ‘no fine-tuning’ principle of parsimony to the quantum realm may well be too
hasty.
1 Introduction: EPRB and faithfulness
Towards the end of the twentieth century progress in the field of machine learning led to the
development of algorithms that could automate the discovery of causes. These so-called causal
discovery algorithms (Spirtes et al., 2000; Pearl, 2009) permit an inference from given statistical
dependences and independences between distinct measurable elements of some system to a
causal model for that system. As part of the algorithms, a series of constraints must be placed
on the resulting models that capture general features that we take to be characteristic of
causation. There are two significant assumptions. The first is the causal Markov condition,
which ensures that every statistical dependence in the data results in a causal dependence in
the model—essentially a formalisation of Reichenbach’s common cause principle. The second
assumption, faithfulness, is that any resultant causal model faithfully reproduces the statistical
dependences and independences; in other words, every statistical independence implies a causal
independence (or, no causal independence is the result of a fine-tuning of the model).
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Figure 1: EPRB experiment with a pair of photons. (Adapted from
(Price and Wharton, 2015, p.7753; Evans et al., 2013, p.302).)
Trouble arises when this causal discovery framework is employed to model certain quantum
phenomena, particularly the observed Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bell (EPRB) correlations in an
entangled bipartite quantum system. To illustrate this, consider such an EPRB experiment,
where each of the parts of the bipartite state are subject to a freely and independently speci-
fiable local measurement, α and β, with two respective possible results for each measurement,
A and B. Figure 1 shows such a system consisting of a pair of photons each passing through
a polariser. The local measurement outcomes in an EPRB experiment on a maximally entan-
gled state are correlated such that the joint probability P(A = B) of the same result at each
measurement device is given by cos2(α− β). Moreover, observed statistical conditional inde-
pendences, (A ⊥⊥ β | α) and (B ⊥⊥ α | β),1 represent the fact that there can be no signalling
from one side of the experiment to the other.
Wood and Spekkens (2015) argue that any causal model purporting to explain the observed
EPRB correlations must be fine tuned. By ‘fine tuned’ they mean that what they call the
‘causal-statistical parameters’, which “specify a conditional probability distribution for every
variable given its causal parents, P (X | Pa(X))” (Wood and Spekkens, 2015, p.4), are precisely
balanced so as to hide any conditional dependence between putatively causally dependent vari-
ables.2 According to the causal modelling framework, the faithfulness assumption states that
every statistical independence implies a causal independence. Applied to the EPRB scenario,
since the observed statistical independences in such a system imply no signalling between the
parties—that is, a statistical independence—one must infer that there can be no (direct or me-
diated) causal link from one side of the experiment to the other. However, the joint probability
over the outcomes, A and B, indicates that there is a statistical dependence between them.
1(X ⊥⊥ Y | Z) denotes that X and Y are conditionally independent given Z:
P(X,Y | Z) = P(X | Z) · P(Y | Z).
2Such parameters are ‘specified’ during the process of model building in the context of causal modelling. For
a successful causal model, this specification will be constrained by the observed (in)dependences.
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According to faithfulness, though, we are unable to account for this dependence with a causal
link unless this link is fine tuned to ensure that (A ⊥⊥ β | α) and (B ⊥⊥ α | β) still hold. There
is thus a fundamental tension between the observed quantum correlations and the no-signalling
requirement, the faithfulness assumption, and the possibility of a causal explanation.
More precisely, Wood and Spekkens (2015, p. 24) show that the following three assumptions
form an inconsistent set:
i) The predictions of quantum theory are correct—that is, the conditional independences
(A ⊥⊥ β | α) and (B ⊥⊥ α | β) are satisfied, and a Bell inequality is violated;
ii) The observed statistical dependences and independences can be given a causal explanation
as per the causal discovery framework;
iii) The faithfulness assumption holds—that is, there is no fine-tuning.
Wood and Spekkens conclude that, since the faithfulness assumption is an indispensable element
of causal discovery, the second assumption must yield. The contrapositive of this is that any
purported causal explanation of the observed no-signalling EPRB correlations in an entangled
bipartite quantum system falls afoul of the tension between the no-signalling constraint and ‘no
fine-tuning’ and, thus, must violate the assumption of faithfulness. Such causal explanations, so
the argument goes, including retrocausal explanations, should therefore be ruled out as viable
explanations.
What is it about the faithfulness assumption that would make it indispensable? The in-
tuition behind the assumption is basic and compelling. When no statistical correlation exists
between the occurrences of a pair of events, we have no reason for supposing there to be a causal
connection between them. Conversely, if we were to allow the possibility of a causal connection
between statistically uncorrelated events, we would have a particularly hard task determining
which of these uncorrelated sets could be harbouring a conspiratorial causal connection that
hides the correlation. We can thus think of the faithfulness assumption as a bit like Occam’s
razor: the simplest explanation for a pair of statistically uncorrelated events is that they are
causally independent. Pearl (2009, p. 48) illustrates this point nicely with an example of a
picture of a chair: we do not expect (i.e. it is unlikely for) a picture of a chair to be a picture
of two chairs perfectly aligned such that one hides the other.
There are well-known examples of systems that potentially show a misapplication of the
faithfulness assumption. One such example, originating in Hesslow (1976), involves a contra-
ceptive pill that can cause thrombosis while simultaneously lowering the chance of pregnancy,
which can also cause thrombosis. As Cartwright (2001, p. 246) points out, given the right
weights for these processes, it is conceivable that the net effect of the pills on the frequency of
thrombosis be zero. This is a case of ‘cancelling paths’, where the effect of two or more causal
routes between a pair of variables cancels to achieve statistical independence. In a case such
as this, since we can have independent knowledge of the separate causal mechanisms involved
here, we have grounds for arguing that there really is a causal connection between the vari-
ables despite their statistical independence. Thus, we can certainly imagine a scenario in which
the faithfulness assumption could lead us astray. However, in defence of the general principle,
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an example such as this clearly contains what Wood and Spekkens refer to as fine-tuning; the
specific weights for these processes would need to match precisely to erase the statistical depen-
dence, and such a balance we would generally think of as unstable (any change in background
conditions, etc. would reveal the causal connection in the form of a statistical dependence).
This paper is an attempt to make trouble for the assumption of faithfulness in the quantum
setting.3 The focus of this trouble is a very simple quantum system investigated in Price (2012),
Evans, Price and Wharton (2013), and Price and Wharton (2015), consisting of a single photon
passing sequentially through two polarisers. This single photon quantum system is noteworthy
because it can be related on symmetry grounds (Evans et al., 2013; Leifer and Pusey, 2017)
to the entangled bipartite quantum system from Figure 1. Since the single photon system is a
temporally oriented version of the spatial correlations of the EPRB system, Evans et al. (2013,
p.302) refer to it as ‘sideways’ EPRB, or SEPRB. Given that certain control constraints on the
initial input of the photon in the sideways system can be formulated to be the temporal reverse
of the output of the ordinary system, I argue here that Wood and Spekkens’ inconsistent set of
assumptions can be applied to this sideways system also.
If this analysis is correct, three options present themselves: (i) the sideways system is as
resistant to causal explanation as the ordinary entangled system; (ii) a violation of faithfulness
in the ordinary entangled system is as tolerable as it is in the sideways system; or (iii) the
symmetries relating the ordinary and sideways systems carry no weight in guiding our response
to Wood and Spekkens’ inconsistent set. I contend that the strength of the symmetry relation
rules out option (iii). Option (ii) provides grounds for accepting the presence of fine-tuning to
explain the observed correlations in an entangled bipartite quantum system. If this option is to
be rejected, as Wood and Spekkens argue, then a compelling case must be made for option (i).
In the absence of such a case, extending the classical ‘no fine-tuning’ principle of parsimony to
the quantum realm may well be too hasty. In so far as ‘no fine-tuning’ is an impediment to the
possibility of local hidden variables,4 abandoning local hidden variables on account of the ‘no
fine-tuning’ principle may well be too hasty also.
2 How signalling and causation come apart
Our interest in this paper is with an experimental set-up closely related to the EPRB set-up of
Figure 1 (in §3 I will argue that this relation is very close indeed). There are two modifications
to the EPRB set-up that can be made to obtain in the new experiment. The first modification
(proposed by Price and Wharton (2015, p.7756)) is to ‘reflect’ one half of the experiment in
time, so to speak, in order to produce a set-up consisting of a single photon that passes through
two polarisers sequentially. This is the ‘sideways’ system, SEPRB. The second modification
3Na¨ger (2016) proposes a related explanation for the unfaithfulness of EPRB correlations. His proposal is
that unfaithfulness is unproblematic so long as it occurs in a stable way, such that any change in background
conditions maintains the unfaithful independences. He suggests that the fine-tuning mechanism in quantum
mechanics is what he calls ‘internal cancelling paths’, and is analogous to the ordinary cancelling paths scenario
just considered. For a detailed critique of Na¨ger’s proposal, and its relation to the sort of retrocausal models
considered below, see Evans (2018). Evans argues that the source of unfaithfulness in a basic retrocausal model
can be interpreted as an example of Na¨ger’s internal cancelling paths.
4Of the sort that could underpin the ψ-epistemic approach to quantum mechanics.
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Figure 2: SEPRB experiment with a single photon. (Adapted from
(Price and Wharton, 2015, p.7757).)
(proposed by Price (2012, p.77)) relates to the nature of what now have become input channels
on the earlier polariser. In the interests of temporal symmetry, Price introduces a demon5 that
controls the inputs to the system to ensure that these are the time-symmetric representation of
the outputs. This second modification leads us to what we will call ‘input-controlled’ SEPRB.
The resulting experimental set-up is shown in Figure 2. The first thing to note about
the SEPRB set-up is that the correlations between A′ and B are exactly the same as the
correlations between A and B in EPRB; that is, P(A′ = B) = cos2(α− β). Thus, the observed
statistical correlations between A′ and B will violate a timelike analogue of Bell’s local causality
condition, and so a CHSH inequality (Leifer and Pusey, 2017).6 The second thing to note is
the nature of the input channels at A′ as a result of the second modification. The input at
A′ for input-controlled SEPRB is the temporal reverse of the output at A for EPRB—that is,
the output at A for EPRB cannot be chosen by the experimenter so, likewise, the input at A′
for SEPRB cannot be chosen either, rather we imagine it to be independently and randomly
generated (by a demon, say). Due to the discrete nature of photons, a single photon must
enter the input polariser exclusively from either the left, A′ = 1, or the right, A′ = 0.7 An
5This demon has been referred to in conference talks by Price as the “demon of the left”, and as “Erutan”
in (Price and Wharton, 2015, p.7757).
6A further demonstration of the power of this analogy between the ordinary spacelike version of the CHSH
inequalities for EPRB and their timelike analogue is demonstrated by Henaut et al. (2018), who show that the
timelike version maintains a game-theoretic quantum advantage over classical systems, despite no possibility of
nonlocality or contextuality.
7Another justification for this feature of the sideways experiment that does not rely on assuming photon
discreteness would be simply to employ time symmetry between the outputs and inputs as per (Leifer and
Pusey, 2017).
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experimenter setting the angle α at A′ is clearly making a difference to the polarisation of the
photon that exits the polariser, albeit this control extends only so far as the photon polarisation
up to an additive factor of pi
2
: the photon could have a polarisation α if the input came from
the left, or a polarisation α + pi
2
if the input came from the right. But due to the fact that the
direction from which the input photon arrives is randomly generated, there is no possibility to
use that difference making to send a signal to the experimenter at B. That is, regardless of the
input channel and setting α, P(B = 0) = P(B = 1) = 1
2
.
This is straightforward to see. Firstly, it is instructive to note that without the ‘input
control’, there is no natural possibility for violations of faithfulness—that is, the causal relation
between the setting α and the subsequent state of the photon manifests in the conditional
probability distributions over the outcomes at B. Since the correlations between A′ and B
are P(A′ = B) = cos2(α− β) and P(A′ 6= B) = sin2(α− β), the probability for a particular
outcome at B is the sum p cos2(α− β) + (1− p)1
2
sin2(α− β), where p ∈ [0, 1] provides weights
over the inputs at A′. When we do not know the value of A′ (as is the case when this input
is hidden and random) then p = 1
2
and the probability of a particular outcome at B becomes
a sum of half the contribution from the A′ = 0 channel and half the contribution from the
A′ = 1 channel, or 1
2
cos2(α− β) + 1
2
sin2(α− β) = 1
2
. As a result of this, it should be obvious
that the probability of either output at B, given some setting β, is independent of the setting
α, (B ⊥⊥ α | β). It should also be relatively uncontroversial to see that (A′ ⊥⊥ β | α).
In this version of input-controlled SEPRB, then, we have a system that has the same corre-
lations as EPRB, and so can violate a Bell inequality, and the same conditional independences
as EPRB, and so satisfies the first condition of Wood and Spekkens’ inconsistent set. This
implies that any causal explanation of the observed statistical dependences must be fine tuned.
Since the intuitive interpretation of SEPRB is that there is a straightforward causal explana-
tion of the correlations (that the photon carries information about α from A′ to B), we have
a simple example of a system that violates faithfulness. But it does not seem that there is
anything pernicious about this violation—in fact we can pinpoint exactly where the fine-tuning
emanates in input-controlled SEPRB.
The face of fine-tuning in the sort of operational description that Wood and Spekkens prefer
is a disconnect between signalling and causation. But in input-controlled SEPRB, this discon-
nect is grounded in the hidden randomness of the input. If the experimenter controlling α at A′
were to discover the actual input channels for each photon, or somehow knew beforehand the
pattern of inputs, it would be straightforward for the experimenter to use the polariser to control
precisely the polarisation of each photon and send a signal. Without this knowledge—that is,
when we have a hidden random input—no signal can be sent. This exposes the patent fact that
the independence (B ⊥⊥ α | β) only holds under a certain specification of conditional probabil-
ity distributions (which are themselves constrained to reproduce the observed independences).
Without this specific balance of the conditional probability distribution P(B | α) = P(B) = 1
2
,
which in this case is a straightforward reflection of the hidden randomness of the input α,
B would be dependent upon α as we would intuitively expect from this sort of experimental
arrangement. This balancing of the causal-statistical parameters to manufacture a statistical
independence between causally dependent variables is precisely what we define as fine-tuning.
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Thus we can see then that this hidden randomness is a condition that, in the right quantum
system, suffices to provide a violation of faithfulness.
We have here a system that violates faithfulness in a way that is completely explicable in
terms of a specific epistemic constraint. We also have some obvious similarities between EPRB
and SEPRB, not least that we have generated SEPRB through a kind of temporal reflection
of one half of EPRB. It would be interesting to investigate the possibility that the same sort
of explication for the source of fine-tuning in SEPRB is available for EPRB also. Conversely,
the same similarities between EPRB and SEPRB might be used as the basis for arguing that
a rejection of fine-tuning, and so a rejection of a causal explanation, in EPRB strengthens
the case that fine-tuning and causal explanation should be rejected for SEPRB also. I will
compose these options into a trilemma in §4 (similar to the trilemma found in (Evans et al.,
2013)). But, of course, all of this hinges on the strength of the similarity between EPRB and
input-controlled SEPRB. In the next section I provide two independent symmetry arguments
in favour of a strong relation between EPRB and SEPRB.
3 Symmetry arguments
Before we consider the two symmetry arguments relating EPRB and SEPRB, let us briefly
consider here to what the analogous source of fine-tuning for EPRB would amount, given our
account above. The key point regarding the source of fine-tuning in SEPRB is that the value
of the input A′ is not available to be conditionalised upon for the purposes of establishing
the relevant conditional probability distributions—that is, the causal-statistical parameters—
relating the variables in the causal model. It is straightforward to see that this is also the case
for EPRB, since by construction the outcome A is not relevant to the choice of measurement
setting α (which is unsurprising, because the input of SEPRB was explicitly constructed to
temporally mirror the left output of EPRB). But for clarity we can consider the analogous
causal dependence that is obscured by fine-tuning.8
Consider the rather counterintuitive scenario that we can somehow know the outcome A
of the measurement A in EPRB before we make our choice of the value of the measurement
setting α. Since P(A = B) = cos2(α− β), if we know that, say, A = 0 as a result of whatever
choice we make for α, then, for a fixed choice β, the probability distribution over the values of
B would be dependent upon α, i.e. P(B | αA) 6= P(B). This highlights the reason that this is
a strange scenario to consider: what would be happening in such a situation is that our choice
α, to maintain outcome A = 0, would seem to be influencing the polarisation of the incoming
photon, and we do not usually consider our measurement outputs fixed and measurement
inputs variable in such scenarios. Nevertheless, this (albeit unusual) dependence of B on α is
a dependence that is obscured by the particular conditional probability distributions over the
outcomes at A and B that we customarily take to model the observed statistical dependences
and independences in EPRB. On this account, the fact that this ‘no-signalling’ independence is
not typically exposed as a causal dependence is because we do not ordinarily conditionalise on
the output variable when determining the other relevant conditional probability distributions,
8For more detail on this analogy and the associated causal dependence, see (Price and Wharton, 2015).
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due to the natural epistemic constraint provided by our own temporal orientation with respect
to the exogenous variables.
However, the two symmetry arguments that we will now consider lend support to the idea
that we should take the analogy between EPRB and SEPRB seriously, and so also the counter-
intuitive causal structure. As such, in the background of these arguments sit a range of further
arguments in favour of a retrocausal interpretation of the EPRB correlations. While addressing
these further arguments is beyond the scope of the current proposal, see Price (2012); Evans
et al. (2013); Price and Wharton (2015) and references therein for further detail.
3.1 Action symmetry
Evans et al. (2013) employ what they call an ‘action symmetry’ to argue in favour of like
ontological ascriptions (or causal explanations, even) to EPRB and SEPRB.9 They note the
following deep similarity between the two systems (Evans et al., 2013, p.306):
they span bounded regions of spacetime with precisely the same electromagnetic action S.
It should therefore be no surprise that the experimental correlations in EPRB and SEPRB
are identical, as our most advanced theory of these interactions – quantum electrodynamics
(QED) – reduces the joint probability to a functional integral of the classical action. . . [under
the right conditions] there is an exact “action symmetry” (S-symmetry) between these two
experiments for any given outcome. . .
The upshot of this action symmetry is that one is able effectively to permute the polariser at
A′ from Figure 2 to other spatiotemporal locations in an action-preserving way; in particular,
one can permute the polariser at A′ into the polariser at A in Figure 1 maintaining the same
action. Thus we have a perfectly natural explanation for why the joint probabilities P(A = B)
and P(A′ = B) are the same: “they result from the same QED mathematics” (Evans et al.,
2013, p.307).
Action-symmetry provides our first argument that there is more than just a superficial
similarity between ERPB and SEPRB. As a result, we should expect equivalent tension in the
two cases between any causal explanation and the faithfulness assumption. The next symmetry
we consider here, operational symmetry, can be characterised as a more general symmetry
principle that in a sense encompasses action-symmetry and provides even stronger grounds for
taking the similarity between EPRB and SEPRB seriously.
3.2 Operational symmetry
In his analysis of quantum contextuality, Spekkens (2005, p.052108-1) proposes a definition of
a noncontextual ontological model in terms of operational equivalences:
A noncontextual ontological model of an operational theory is one wherein if two experimen-
tal procedures are operationally equivalent, then they have equivalent representations in the
ontological model.
This definition amounts to something akin to Leibniz’ Law for dealing with operational equiv-
alences: no ontological difference without operational difference. Following Spekkens (2005)
9The action symmetry is developed further in (Wharton et al., 2011).
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and, indeed, Wood and Spekkens (2015), an operational model is a specification of a set of
possible preparations, transformations, and measurements, along with associated conditional
probability distributions for the relevant variables. Thus, operational equivalence is simply an
equivalence of conditional probability distributions between corresponding variables. Signifi-
cantly, conditional probability distributions do not necessitate a temporal direction, and thus
it need not matter in which temporal direction the specific variables are related.
Leifer and Pusey (2017, p.4), in their response to Price (2012), extend Spekkens’ operational
equivalence principle to motivate their assumption of time symmetry: “a symmetry of the
operational predictions ought to also hold at the ontological level”. Since for the case of EPRB
and input-controlled SEPRB we have just such a symmetry of the operational predictions—a
temporal symmetry by construction that renders the outputs at A operationally equivalent to
the inputs at A′—we should expect that any causal explanation (i.e. at the ontological level)
should be equivalent between the two cases. And so we should expect equivalent tension in the
two cases between any causal explanation and the faithfulness assumption.
Somewhat more speculatively, it appears that this operational symmetry might come in a
stronger flavour. Shrapnel and Costa (2018) develop a generalised ontological models framework
that does not include any assumptions about causal structure. Within their framework, one
separates a system of interest into local laboratories with local controllables, and distinguishes
between all those parts of the system that are correlated with the controllables, and the rest of
the invariant structure (including whatever causal structure) of the environment that mediates
the correlations between local observables (what they call the process). With one small caveat
that the local laboratory at A′ is the temporal inverse of the local laboratory at A, EPRB
and SEPRB are both members of the same equivalence class of processes. Applying Spekkens’
operational equivalence principle amounts to claiming that there should be no ontological dif-
ference between EPRB and SEPRB, and so no difference in causal explanation. Thus, again,
we should expect equivalent tension in the two cases between any causal explanation and the
faithfulness assumption.
4 A trilemma
If these symmetry arguments are on the right track, then we can confidently say that whatever
consequences arise for a causal explanation in EPRB should arise also for a causal explanation
in SEPRB, and vice versa. For instance, when we hold fixed the input at A in EPRB (as is
necessitated), our choice α influences the probability distribution over the value of the outcome
A, and so we ascribe a causal explanation to the correlation between our choice α and the output
at A. Likewise, when we hold fixed the output at A′ in SEPRB (albeit counterintuitively), it
becomes clear that our choice α influences the probability distribution over the value of the
input A′ (by constraining, say, the choice that the demon can make to ensure the fixed output
at A′), and so the above symmetries dictate that in this counterintuitive scenario we should
similarly ascribe a causal explanation to the correlation between our choice α and the input at
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A′.10
We are now in a position to present the trilemma I alluded to in §1.
i) SEPRB is as resistant to causal explanation as EPRB on account of rejecting fine-tuning;
ii) a violation of faithfulness in EPRB is as tolerable as it is in SEPRB;
iii) the symmetries relating EPRB and SEPRB carry no weight in guiding our response to
Wood and Spekkens’ analysis.
Given the strength of the arguments in the previous section, I set aside option (iii) rejecting
the symmetries, but note that this does remain a live option. This leaves options (i) and (ii),
each of which by my lights stands or falls on the potency of the narrative I have presented for
input-controlled SEPRB. I wish to finish off this analysis with some general discussion points
that bear upon how one might approach the residual dilemma.
The first point to make concerns the origin of the fine-tuning in SEPRB. The fine-tuning
we find here comes from the randomisation of the inputs at A′, independent of and hidden
from the local experimenters. This inaccessible randomisation of inputs is motivated by time
symmetry to be the temporal reverse of the operational process that characterises the stochastic
nature of the outputs at A. But when viewed in the context of SEPRB, our intuition for a
causal explanation is overwhelmingly strong and, once we are aware of the process by which
the ‘demon’ feeds the input channels, such a causal explanation does not seem objectionable or
mysterious. Moreover, understanding that the demonic process is the temporal reverse of an
ordinary stochastic process further ameliorates any concern about any sort of cosmic conspiracy
aligning the causal parameters of the system to erase the possibility of signalling—‘fine-tuning’
in this sense is just what we would expect to arise from this specific type of epistemic constraint.
Leifer and Pusey (2017) explicitly point out, in their response to Price’s (2012) discussion
of what we have called here input-controlled SEPRB, that some sort of ‘no fine-tuning’ as-
sumption must be violated. They outline that they take the most legitimate way of dealing
with fine-tuning to be by accounting for the fine-tuning as some emergent feature of the sys-
tem. They indicate that perhaps the absence of signalling to the past and its uncoupling with
any potential retrocausal influence could arise from the same process from which the ther-
modynamic arrow emerges, so explaining the fine-tuning without basing it on a fundamental
physical principle. The current proposal is consistent with this account of emergent fine-tuning:
a violation of faithfulness in SEPRB is by construction a function of the limited epistemic ac-
cess an experimenter has to the input channels. But the purpose of this construction was to
emulate the temporal inverse of the randomised outputs from a polarising beam splitter in the
EPRB experiment, where the outputs arise stochastically. So the analogy in the EPRB case
would be that the fine-tuning required by a causal explanation for the correlations in the face
of no-signalling emerges from the randomness of the outputs, rather than being a fundamental
feature of any physical system.
10We do not usually think of this sort of causal relation as one that we can exploit for purposes of control
since, due to our inherent temporal orientation, we are never in a position to hold fixed outputs in this way; we
usually take the input at A′ to be exogenous, and the output endogenous, not the other way around.
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Let us now consider if we were to reject fine-tuning, as Wood and Spekkens do, what option
(i) would entail. Pursuing option (i) requires us not only to reject any (retro)causal expla-
nation of the correlations between A and B in EPRB, but also to reject the causal narrative
that we tell to explain why the input at A′ is correlated with the output at B in SEPRB. In
the latter case we ordinarily find it straightforward to explain the correlation in an SEPRB
experiment between the inputs and outputs: the classical causal narrative claims that the
photon carries with it information about its polarisation state upon which the outcome is con-
ditional. If rejecting fine-tuning means rejecting classical causal explanations such as this, then
we would no longer be able to avail ourselves of this intuitive picture underlying the statistical
correlations between input and output. Let us not underestimate the importance of such causal
explanation—beyond simply accounting for observed phenomena, a causal explanation provides
understanding of a physical process. In the absence of a causal explanation, we lack insight into
the unobservable world. Relatedly, in so far as this sort of classical causal picture is necessary
for a realist ontology, option (i) would be pushing us towards a necessary operationalism about
quantum phenomena.11 While there is nothing necessarily wrong with rejecting classical causal
explanation in this way, it is not a cost-free manoeuvre, and a more compelling case must be
mounted in its favour.
5 Concluding remarks
Wood and Spekkens claim that the faithfulness assumption is an indispensable element of
causal discovery. That may be correct—the specific machine learning algorithms that isolate
causal structure may well require a constrained framework within which to operate. But this
framework is motived by the relative scarcity of formal tools available for characterising causal
reasoning in statistics, medicine, economics, social science, and especially the fields of artificial
intelligence and cognitive science (Pearl (2009, p.xiii); Pearl et al. (2016, p.xi)). Causal dis-
covery algorithms, and the causal assumptions that underpin them, come with no guarantee
that they will be applicable to the observed correlations between and within quantum systems.
This paper presents a case to undermine the reasonableness of the assumption of faithfulness
in the quantum context. Short of a rejection of a causal explanation in a straightforward single
photon system, I contend that this ‘sideways’ system is, according to Wood and Spekkens’ anal-
ysis, fine tuned. This at least partially mitigates the concern that entangled bipartite quantum
systems themselves violate faithfulness. Thus, extending the classical ‘no fine-tuning’ principle
of parsimony to the quantum realm may well be too hasty. In so far as ‘no fine-tuning’ is an
impediment to the possibility of local hidden variables, abandoning local hidden variables on
account of the ‘no fine-tuning’ principle may well be too hasty also.
As a final note of warning, even if a violation of faithfulness in the EPRB experiment might
be given a ‘natural’ explanation along the lines given above, and so diminish such violation as a
sticking point for retrocausal explanations of the correlations between entangled quantum sys-
tems, a much more serious challenge faces any explanation of quantum phenomena in terms of
11Alternatively, one might provide an account of quantum causal explanation that explains both the EPRB
and SEPRB experiments in terms of a quantum causal model (Costa and Shrapnel, 2016).
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exotic causal structures. Shrapnel and Costa (2018) argue that any non-contextual ontological
model incorporating exotic causal structure cannot match the observed statistical predictions
of quantum mechanics. That is, ontological models accounting for observed quantum statistics
must be necessarily contextual. But in so far as contextuality is a kind of fine-tuning (Cav-
alcanti, 2018), the sort of ‘natural’ explanation of violations of faithfulness in SEPRB looks
like exactly what would be needed to provide a justification of a contextual ontological model
employing exotic causal structure explaining quantum statistics. Whether this can be done,
however, is an open problem.
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